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STATEi ~Ei.r:' CF SEi!ATCr. NIXE i·.lf. i·1!3I.i'IE1D (D., i:-ICNT1J.11•) 
o~~ ---.-----
FOREIGN RELATIONS: LATE-SUHl'IER 1959 
Hr. President: 
It may seem at this moment a remote possibility, but at 
some point the first session of the 86th Congress will come to a 
close. The first snows of l'linter will undoubtedly have settled on 
the mountains of Montana by the time the final gavel falls. It 
may be that the first snows will have even descended in Washington. 
Sooner or later, however, we shall finish the work of this session. 
And sooner or later we shall adjourn. 
I have sought the floor today in the e~~pectation--perhaps 
unwarranted--that adjournment may come sooner rather than later. 
I have sought it in order to make certain summary remarks on the 
international situation and the present state of the nation's 
foreign relations. 
It is not easy to dra't-7 up a balance sheet of this kind. 
Yet the attempt to do so on other occasions, I beli eve, has been 
helpful and it may prove to be helpful now. 
In broad terms, I suppose, one mi ght say that since the 
nati on is not f i ghting a war i n this late-summer 1959, the balance 
sheet i s fine. That sort of observati on, comforting though it may 
be, tell s us nothing of the stubborn internati onal realities with 
which we w~st live, wi th whi ch we must continue to contend. 
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It may be good politics to say that the absence of fight-
ing on our part proves how successful our foreign policy has been. 
It may make for happy headlines. It may be good politics, but I 
do not know that it is good government. This superfic:al observa-
tion produces a false sense of security in the nation. It masks 
the very likely possibility that we may be at a peace of sorts--
not necessarily because of our policies, but in spite of some of 
them, and that pieces may now be falling into place in the complex 
pattern of international relations which, when fully assemblied, 
may fuse in the full fury of nuclear war. 
The observation that we have peace, moreover, shunts aside 
the domestic implications of present international policies. It 
completely ignores the grave burden of taxation, and the inflation-
ary pressures which arise from the enormous cost of the defense 
establishment and overseas activities of various kinds which are 
involved in maintaining this so-called peace. We do not know, 
really, with any degree of precision the needs of any of these 
operations or how efficiently any are run. All we know is that 
these defense and other operations--as much as the Congress will 
allow--are pressed upon us on the grounds that they are required 
to maintain this so-called peace. At the same time, the Administra-
tion has admonished the Congress to limit the buildup of essential 
domestic services and activities in education, housing, road con-
struction, social security, slum clearance, law enforcement, re-
source development and countless others under a budget which goes 
overwhelmingly for defense and international programs of one kind 
or another. 
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In short, to maintain this peace of sorts, we are eating 
into--or at any rate, not building adequately--our capital invest-
ment in the social structure of the nation. That may be unavoidable 
in present circumstances but when we talk lightly of having peace--
let us not lose sight of what we are doing and of the monumental 
problems whichthe neglect of domestic needs is building up for the 
years ahead. 
lfuo can speak, in all honesty, of the existence of peace 
in this late-summer of 1959 when the continent of Europe remains 
divided by hostile and unreconciled ideologies and other spawns of 
conflict? vfuen the concept of live and let live which encourages 
men and nations to rational settlement of their difficulties has 
still so little depth in that key region? l~en Western Europe 
shows evidence of serious fissures in its essential unity? 
vfuo can spe&~, in all honesty, of peace when a wall of 
ignorance builds ever higher be~qeen this nation and China and be-
hind it there develops a new and explosive p~1er nurtured heavily 
on hatred of the United States? vfuile this situation prevails, to 
talk glibly about the existence of peace today may be to exact a 
terrible price out of our children's tomorrow. 
l~ can spe&<, in all honesty, of peace when in the great 
arc of nations extending from Korea, around the rim of Asia, 
through the Middle East and Africa and even into the nearby Carib-
bean, there are only scattered oases of stability? l~en in this 
vast area, too often there exists a seething violence just beneath 
the surface of daily life? ~en whole peoples grow restless in the 
search for new roots to feed their survival and growth? 
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Mr. President, by ignoring such realities as these, I 
suppose one may concoct a bright balance sheet of the world situa-
tion and find in it reason to pride ourselves on the success of 
our foreign policies and their administration. Unfortunately, it 
also gives us cause for national self-delusion and I, for one, 
cannot certify to any such balance sheet. Equally, I cannot join 
those who, seeing only such realities as I have just enumerated, 
are plunged into a cynical gloom, a deadening hopelessness over the 
fate of the nation and mankind. 
No, Nr. President, I do not believe that we can conclude, 
from the present situation, either the certainty of a durable peace 
and continued progress, or the inevitability of retrogression and 
tragic war. The international situation in late-summer 1959, as 
it has been for some time, is nei ther black nor t-lhite but many 
shades of gray. It would be best to dispell any illusions that 
we have peace in our times and count mankind lucky that 't"le even 
have peace for this day. 
As a nation, we are still in the midst of a gigantic 
and enormously expensive holding action throughout the world. At 
some critical points in this action there are rays of hope that 
potential conflicts will yield to reason or, at least, that the 
vast cost of the holding action can be reduced. At others, we are 
staging merely a rear-guard action in which the way to a durable 
peace i s not yet even dimly seen. 
We will do well, therefore, to put aside the glib evalua-
tion of the state of the world as being one of peace in this late-
sunmer of 1959 and the state of our foreign policy as being one of 
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success. At best, th~ world and this nation as a part of it, has 
just barely got its head above water. If there is any broad 
generalization that is applicable, it is that ·w~ are in a period of 
change in which we may go down or up but one in which--in any event--
we cannot remain just where we are. In these circumstances we shall 
increase our prospects of finding the way up, the w~ to peace, only 
as we turn our attention to the specifics, to the principal problems 
which confront us in the world. Vle shall find our way only as we 
try to gauge accurately the changing content of these problems, only 
as we eJtamine and reeJtamine honestly the present policies by which 
we are seeking to deal with these problems and weigh and re-weigh 
the effectiveness of the adminmtration of these policies. In short, 
in an era of change in international relations we need to understand 
clearly the possibilities of the change and be prompt to act on 
them. If we fail to do so ~~e shall be left high and dry as the tide 
of change moves on and away from us. 
Germany 
In one critical area, Nr. President, in Gei..'"lllany, the pres-
su_!:e for change is great and it is rising. It is fed by developments 
within Germany, within Europe, perhaps even within the Soviet Union 
itself. 
VIe may now be in a position to deal more successfully with 
these pressures than in the past. Dy successfully, let me add, I 
mean we may be able to deal with them in a way that leads towards 
a more durable peace without prejudice to freedom. Certainly, Mr. 
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President, during the 86th Congress we have sharpened the tools of 
foreign policy for coping with the complex German situation. Our 
policies have been recast. Hithout aleration in basic principle, 
they have been redesigned more closely in line 't'lith the realities 
of the Germany and Europe of 1959 rather than of 1950 or 1945. In 
a phrase, we have refurbished these policies and brought them up to 
date. 
True, the division in nerlin, Germany and, in a larger 
sense, in Europe has not yet ended. nut at least, the revisions 
of our policy have helped to deflect, for the present, the headlong 
plunge towards open conflict in Berlin. At least, there is now 
some chance that the exchanges of heads and near-heads of states 
may set in motion more tangible action on peace than the generali-
ties which emerged from Geneva in 1955. There is no guarantee that 
such will be the result but at least the hope is alive. 
There is credit enough for all in this achievement. It 
is due in no small measure to the final efforts of the late Secre-
tary of State. In his last visit to Europe and in his final press 
s~Atements Mr. Dulles set the stage for what has become a fresh, a 
positive \<lestern approach to the problems of Germany. 
This Congress has also made its contribution. For one 
thing, the Senate took the German question out of the deep-freeze. 
It opened the question to full discussion and let in new thought 
and new ideas where for years there had been only ritualistic 
repetition of the old, the tired and the increasingly unreal. Dis-
tinguished l1embers of this body, the outstanding Chairman of the 
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Foreign Relations Committee (Nr o Fulbright), the Senator from vJest 
Virginia (r1r. Byrd), the Senatozo from Pennsylvania (Nr. Clark), the 
Senator from Connecticut (Hr. Dodd), the Senato:t: from Kentucky (Mr. 
Cooper), the Senator from New Yorlt (l1r. Javits), the Senator from 
Alabama (l1r. Sparkman), and others joined in these discussions at 
various times. And out of this many-sided debate emerged, I am 
sure, much that was useful for those charged with administering 
foreign policy. 
The work of the President of the Senate (Mr. Nixon) on 
the occasion of his voyage to rrussia and Poland was also of the 
greatest importance. He made an outstanding effort to bridge the 
almost unbridgeable gap in understanding between Russia and the 
United States and to enlarge the measure of civility in the relations 
between the two nations. 
Hr. Herter's work at Geneva, in difficult circumstances, 
was skillful and dedicated. In cooperation with other VJestem na• 
tions he succeeded in reinterpreting \rJestern policies with respect 
to Germany in the light of today's realities rather than yesterday's 
expectations. He set forth new proposals whose significance is not 
likely to be lost on the rest of the world, even though they may 
have fallen on deaf ears as regards the Soviet Foreign Minister at 
Geneva. One may hope, even, that their significance will not be 
lost on Mr. Khrushchev. Only last February he indicated that very 
similar proposals which I had listed in a speech in the Senate could 
form the basis for reasonable negotiation. 
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Berlin 
As for Berlin, Hr. President, that city was and still is 
the crux of danger in Germany. I say that notwithstanding the fact 
that the crisis-date which was originally concocted by the Soviet 
Union has come and long since gone without serious incident. I say 
that because Berlin in its location, in its continued division and 
uncertain status still contains live seeds of conflict. I say that 
because a divided alien occupation of that city--Soviet and Western 
alike--is an m1achronism almost a decade and a half after the end 
of war. I say that because the close prmdmity of antagonistic 
forces in the legal no-man's land of nerlin constitutes a serious 
source of accidental or spontaneous military combustion. 
tJhatever it may appear to be from the Soviet point of 
view, from the vlestern point of view, I believe, it is time for a 
change in Berlin. But let me stress, ~~. President, that when I 
suggest that it is time for a change I do not mean a change in 
Hest Berlin alone, as the communists '<'lould have it. It is time 
for a change in all Berlin. 
Because I believe that in any give and take negotiation, 
both parts of Berlin must be involved, I find lt disconcerting to 
discover that Western diplomacy has permitted the discussion of the 
Berlin issue to center more and more on the status of Hest nerlin 
alone. I do not see that this issue--this issue of a dangerously 
divided nerlin--is an issue of VJestern troop levels in the city. 
Nor is it one of the tyPe of arms which vJestern troops may bear in 
that city. It is not one of whether the Russians will or will not 
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guarantee our rights there for one yea~, five years or forever. 
Yet, these matters \'lere the center of discussion regarding Berlin 
at Geneva. It seems to me that if we mem1 it when we say we shall 
stand fast in VJest Berlin, these are not matters for discussion. 
To permit talks with the Soviet Union to center on them 
seems to me to reveal a temptation to buy the continuance of our 
presence in Berlin at the price of unilateral c~ncessions. I do 
not believe that will work, for the price once paid is likely to go 
higher and higher. And even if it did work, what would we have 
bought? We would have bought nothing more than an indefinite and 
expensive prolongation of the present unsatisfactory, costly and 
unstable occupation. We would not have advanced one step towards a 
more rational, a more durable peace. Until when would this occupa-
tion continue, Mr. President? Until 1970, 19GO, until the year, 
2000? 
If the issue is not negotiable by a change in the status 
of l•Jest Berlin alone, is it negotiable by a change in the status of 
all Derlin--of vJest Berlin and East nerlin? It will not be negoti-
able in these terms if those who use the words of peace are not 
prepared to act for peace. vJe shall not kno\-7 whether that is the 
case. however, unless we are clear in our o~m minds that we seek, 
as a positive act for peace, a new status for all Berlin. If we 
are clear on that point then I bel;eve we may, with profit to all, 
assume the advocacy of internationalization of the entire city, on 
an interim basis, until it is once again the capital of a unified 
Germany. 
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Again, let me stress z it is oEe tl':_ing t£._ internationalize 
only vJest Berlin under the auspices of the United Nations as the 
Russians have proposed. It would be an entirely different matter 
to internationalize the entire city of Berlin--East and west--undeE 
those auspices, as an interim arrangement. In that there might well 
be a valid quid pro guo. 
In recent days there have been reports that the Russians 
are prepared to accept \!Jest Germans as replacements for the non-
German garrisons nm-1 in vJest Derlin. I have no way of telling 
whether these reports are accurate. If there is any truth in them~ 
I do not see that the idea should be rejected out of hand. On the 
contrary, the idea may well be advanced for exploration by the 
Hestern natiom themselves even if the Russians have not done so. 
If Hest Germans can replace other vJestern forces in Derlin and if 
Soviet troops are withdrawn from the city, at least the rudiments 
of an all-German administration of nerlin will ex-i st. If this ad-
ministrati. on operated, on an interim basis, under ultimate U.N. or 
other international cont~ol, ~·lith guaranteed rights of free access 
to all from all directions, a ne't-1 and more durable situation might 
exist in nerlin than that which now prevails. 
I should be less than frank, £1'1r. Pres1_dent, i f I did not 
state my view that we have not yet suffic-iently eltplored the poten-
tial role of the United Nations and vJest Germans in the Berlin situa-
tion. I think there is time to remedy that shortcoming. Indeed, 
it might well be done in conjunction with the coming exchanges be-
tween Mr. Eisenhower and Hr. Khrushchev. 
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Hestern Europe 
Turning to another major aspect of the international 
situation, I should like to consider briefly the state of relations 
among the vJestern European nations and among the N .A. T .o. members. 
There have always been differences among these nations; that is not 
in itself the problem. The problem is that in recent years short-
range differences have threatened increasingly to overbalance the 
long-range cohesive forces which hold the Western nations together. 
That is the danger, Hr. President. It is a danger, ironi-
cally, \~hich does not come primarily from the Russians although they 
have long sought the disruption of the alliance. Rather it comes 
primarily from developments vdthin the He stern alliance itself. 
And, ironically, the danger comes in part from the very success of 
the alliance. 
The sense of restored security, the prosperity and prog-
ress of recent years has permitted national clashes of interest 
\•7ithin the very institutions which did so much to bring about the 
i!'Q]g'ovement in the Hestern nations. This is evident in the decline 
of respect for the military command of H.A.T.O. and it is evident 
in the clash of economic purpose as between the Inner Six of the 
European Common Harket and the outer ring of European nations which 
is forming i n self-defense or for the purposes of economic counter-
measures. It is evident, too, in the tendency of a legitimate na-
tional pride sometimes to give way to a auestionable national con-
ceit which sees itself as the sole source of wisdom and leadership 
for the vJest. 
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If present tendenc:l.es :m t:1e ~Jes-:.:ern a.lJ.iance pe:::-sist, 
1 am afraid it ·1:1ill not be long before the handv1riting will be very 
evident on the v1all. Increasin3ly, individual states or inner 
groups of states, in pursuit of their own immediate national ad-
vantage and oblivious or indifferent to the needs of others will 
spur the rest to the same course. The short-range interests of 
each shall take precedence over the long-range needs of all and to 
the degree that they do so the house of vJestern unity, built with 
great care and at great e~~pense, ~-Jill be threatened. To be sure, 
the institutions are likely to l:'emain but they w::11 be, increasingly, 
stripped of substance. 
I do not know whether present trends can be rev~~~ 
I do not lmow how much influence the United States can exert to 
that end. The fact is that major changes have tal:en place vlithin 
Hestern Europe in recent years. The effect, ~rhaQS the inevitable 
effect, of these changes has been to reduce the ·:nfluence of the 
United States and to heighten that of the Europeans themselves in 
European affa~rs. 
It "t-lill serve no useful purpose to ~-Jring our hands over 
this situation, to look for scapegoats, or to continue to bury the 
problem in words of unity and immodest presumptions of American 
leadership as usual. P-ather, it will be better to learn to live 
with the changes in Europe "t-Jhich ue did so much to bring about 
with the i1arshall Plan and our actual postwar leadership. 'lJhat is 
important now is to try to preserve "t-Jhat needs to be preserved, to 
try to preserve the essentials of Uestern unity. 
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It is helpful, I bel:·-e~.!.-tha~ the P:-cesid~nt has gone to 
Europe. He is, in his person, one of the great symbols of \rlestern 
cooperation. I do not think, however, that symbols are enough. 
Not even 't'7ell-spoken words of unity are enough. He have had those 
at every conference of the Hestern nations but the differences have 
continued to accumulate. 
I believe the time .ha~ come to put aside the generaliza-
tions on unity and to look squarely at, and talk frankly to, the 
points of disunity in the \:Jestern all:!..an.ce. I think the time has 
come for a blunt conference which puts the cards on the table 't'lith 
respect to the condition of H.A.T.O. He need to delineate the ex-
tent of the erosion. ~ve neeC. to determine what revisions are neces-
sary to revitalize this organization and other institutions of 
l'·1estern unity in the light of the changing European situation. In 
short we need to face what it is that is bothering the members of 
the Hestern alliance -if we are to do anything constructive about 
the difficulties. 
I think the time has come, especially 2 for a frank con-
ference on the economic rivalries which are beginn·lng to plague the 
European nations and which, sooner or later, 't'lill_make their effect 
felt on this country. 
It may be, finally, that the time has come for us to move 
out of the full glare of the spotl·i ght of NATO activity and to 
welcome fromthe Europeans--l3rit·lsh.z French, Italians, Germans, and 
others--the assumption of a greater measure of leadership in its 
undertakings, a greater measure of responsibility and contribution 
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in Europe. T trust that this observation will not be interpreted 
as an advocacy of P~erican with~rawal from Europe. It is not in-
tended as such. I:.ather, ·i t is intended as a frank recognition that 
circumstances have changed in Europe and, in consequence, a change 
in the position of the United States in I·Testern European affairs may 
also be warranted and desirable. 
The /unericas 
Turning ne:Kt to Latin L'.merica, Nr. President, it seems 
to me that the situation, pa~t~cularly in the Caribbean, is a most 
uncertain one. It is going to require patience and great effort 
by all of the American states if a series of little vlars spawned 
by d~ctatorship and revolut~on is not to pla~~e that region for 
months or, perhaps, even yea~s to come. 
Ohen a revolut i onary fervor, nurtured on years of oppres-
sion and brutal:.".. ty achieves i ts ends, perhaps counter-e~~cesses are 
inevitable. Tyranny ·is gr-:rn bus -> ness and it is not surprising that 
it produces revolut i ons which are also grim i n their consequences. 
Dut, I1r. Pres~dent, there comes a moment for an end to 
e~~cesses. There comes a t 1me to settle down to construction of the 
ne"t-J after destruct·~ on of the old, a time to put aside the fury, if 
the high ideals which dr·ive men to understandable revolt are not 
to be lost ; n a t' · ~ ~ blood ~ con 1nu1ng ~ ow of and hatred. 
I hope that moment will not be lost 1n the situation in 
the Car .:.bbean. If it is not l _os_t_, _!h~re is reason to bel:teve that 
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~-1e are at the beginnings of a beg:2.E_r!._~- o2 -~2-~e::: ~c!.....Prma5.s i ng era 
in inter-American relations. 
This new stirring, I believe, found official e~~pression 
in the recent Declaration of Santiago. Unless I mis i nterpret that 
document, it points to a further evolution in inter-American rela-
tions. The Americas 2 I believe.L may be on ~h.e verge of brin~ 
into the Good Neighbor concept--~nto the doctrine of non-interven-
tion--anothe~ concept~ that of the Conscience of the Americas. If 
this i nterpretation is correct, i t means that as the Hemisphere de-
plores intervention in the affairs of one nation~ another, it 
deplores egually the bruta1 den~al, by dictatorship, of basic human 
decency anywhere in the hemisphere. 
Good Neighbors normally stay out of each other's family 
affairs and those who me?dle or intervene are rightfully condemned. 
I3ut sometimes the affairs ·i n one house reach such a point of tyranny 
that good neighbors can no longer be indifferent to the agony of 
injustice and brutalitx wh~ch emanates from it. No single American 
nation can decide when that point has been reached. Not even two 
or three. Dut, ·it seems to me that when t:v10-thirds or three-
quarters of the American republics reach such a conclusion, then 
the good conscience of the entire community is involved and the 
community has a responsibi 'J i ty to do someth:.ng about it. In time 
2 
Ur. Pres ··dent, we shall find ways, common ~·mys, ·inter-American 
ways, to mal~e the d·i staste and ·: ndignati on of the Americas felt 
by those '-1ho outrage the conscience of the Amer·l cas. ?erhaps, then, 
we shall see an end to the cycle of di ctatorsh1p, revolution, 
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dictatorship which for, too long, has been the curse of many ~arts 
of this hem~sphere. 
For our part, l'·'lr. Pres::.dent, I believe our policies are 
evolving to adjust to the chang:1..ng concept "1hich I have just out-
lined, as well as to other new needs of inter-American relations. 
The change comes in good time because, for years, we have been 
consuming the goodwill which the Good Neighbor policy of another 
generation created. The :i.ntentions of the people of the United 
States, as expressed in the Congress these past few years, have 
been good, Uhere "tve have failed is ~\.n the administration of policy. 
In that connection, we have shmm a singular lack of awareness of 
the changes in attitudes, hopes, needs and values in Latin America. 
In consequence, we failed to develop the nev1 ideas, the alert 
leadership and the inspired official representation in Latin 
Pmerica which would permit us to act in accord with these changes. 
Now that defect is, I hope, in the process of be~ng remedied. 
The initiative has come largely from the Congress. I 
have in mind particularly the uork of the Subcommittee under the 
Chairmanship of the Senator from Oregon (Hr. Horse), and the bold 
and constructive ideas of the Senator from Flor:i.da (Hi:, Smathers) 
who has shown such a consistent and intelligent interest in that 
area. I believe, too, that the :!.ncreasing currency "t·lhich has been 
given in this country to t he vieus of the dist::.nguished Governor of 
Puerto D:!.co (l1r. 1-iunoz l1arin) and to the Puerto llican e~cperience 
generally has been most helpful. 
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Hr. President, I should like !Q_..§.dd one furt~1er observa-
t i on to these remarks on the Amer·: cas. vJhen we talk of the .Ameri-
cas, scarcely, i f ever, i s Cc:,nada included i n our thoughts. That 
i s not merely oversight. It is a habit of mind with decades of 
usage beh-i nd i t. It seems to me that it is high time to raise the 
quest i on as to "t·lhether this habit of mind continu~ to have validit,I 
i n the m·i d-t\venti eth century or v1hether i t survives on sheer 5.nert:ta 
alone. 
Personally, I believe that it is the latter. Congress 
has taken a s i gni ficant i n i tiative in recent years, i n remedying 
this s i t uati on. I am thin:.dng now of the work of the Canadian-
United States Interparli maentary Group. On the Senate side, thi s 
"t'lorl~ i s bei ng carri ed out under the Chai rmanshi p of the able, con-
structi ve, and conscienti ous Senator from Vermont (ftlr. Aiken) and 
~contribution has been an outstanding one. 
Mr. Pres i dent, I recogni ze that Canada has far flung 
_commitments, in the Commonv1ealth, i n the United Nations and i n 
other associ at i ons. I "tvonder, however, "tvhether the time has not 
come for the Ameri can Republi cs to recogni ze t hat Canada i s also 
of the Ameri cas and may have much to offer and to gain by closer 
associ at i on wi th the other nati ons of this hem-: sphere? vJhat I am 
suggest ::.ng, Nr . Pres -I dent, i s that i t may be desirable to undertake 
i n the Canadian-Uni ted States parl ::.amentary meeti ngs and ·i n other 
appropr::.ate ways. a preliminary e~::plorat ion to determine whether or 
not Canadi an membershi p i n, or assoc i ation wi th the Organizati on of 
the P~erican States may not be of benefi t to all concerned. 




Cur attention of late, Hr . President, has been fi:it.ed on 
Germany, Europe and Latin America. nut the scope of our relations 
being world-wide, 't~e may anticipate that from time to time other 
nations, other areas will move into the forefront of our awareness. 
Rarely in the spot-light, yet never far from it is the 
emerging continent of ne~;r nations in Africa. Since 1951, six in-
dependent countries have appeared in regions which were formerly 
colonies. I believe that 1;~e have a good chance to get off on the 
right foot \'lith these ne"t-;r nations. Certainly, the Department of 
State in response to the 5..nitiat::.ve of Congress, has reorganized 
in a fash5..on which creates a better opportunity ·to bring about 
that result. Heretofore, African affairs were buried in separate 
niches in the various European Desks. Now, however, on the basis 
of legislation pressed by the Qistinguished Chairman-Emeritus of 
the Foreign Relations Committee (Hr. Green) there is an Assistant 
Secretary o~ State for African Affairs. This means among other 
things, tir. President, that official information and evaluations 
with respect to the African nations no longer are passed through 
the viev~oint of other countries and areas before they flow into 
total United States policy. In short, Hr. 1?resident, the indepen-
dent nations of Africa now stand on an equal footing with those of 
Europe, Asia and elsewhere, as far as the machinery of our foreign 
policy is concerned. 
Elsewhere in the world, Hr. President, with rare excep-
tions, \ve are just muddling along in the patterns of past policy, 
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at great expense to the publ::..c and 't·lith few tangible ev::.dences of 
achievements leading to a greater stability and progress in those 
areas and, hence, to more benefici al relations 't'l:.th them in the 
f-uture. 
In the Hiddle East, for example, we find the same ten-
dencies, as in the past, to transfer high official hopes, almost 
i n desperati on, from ruler to ruler, from nation to nati on, as the 
sands of internati onal political intrigue in that region shift 
f i rst in one direction and then in another. The Eisenhower Doc-
trine, as many of us anticipated at the time i t \'las enunciated, 
l i es almost buried in these sands. The Daghdad Pact acguires a 
new name but even less content. 
And still, the real problems of the H2.ddle East r emain: 
The refugees; the deni al of the use of Suez on an equal basis to 
all; the monstrous poverty and ignorance of the many in the midst 
of the vast wealth and culture of the few; the border questions 
and the smolderi ng hatred and suspi cion between Israeli and Arab. 
Hone of these--the real problems of the Niddle East--appear to be 
any closer to solution than they 't·;rere a decade ago. Nevertheless 
the outpouri ng of publi c funds for the regi on goes on in the bland 
assumpti on that we are doi ng somethi ng about these problems. How 
much longer, ilr. Presi dent? 
Sooner or later, in the admini strati on of pol~cies with 
respect to the i1iddle East we are going to have to make up our 
minds. Sooner or later we are goi ng to have to face the fact that, 
for thi s nati on as a whole, there are some things more important 




than r,liddle Eastern oil, mil~.tary bases or the soothing of the 
ultra-nationalistic tantrums of one nation or another. 
Sooner or later, 't<7e are going to have to decide who in 
the Middle East works sincerely and with forebearance to end the 
state of fear and incipient ~t-Jar which prevails in that region and 
who :;.ntrigues to perpetuate it. 1:-Je are going to have to decide 
which goven1ments render a ~ecent measure of justice to their 
peoples and act for their peaceful progress and 'ivhich governments 
exploit their passions for selfish or destructive ends. 
Hhen we have made these decisions then, perhaps, we may 
be able to devise policies for \·lhich ~tJe need not apologize, poli-
cies which "-Jill have some strength to stand in the midst of poli-
tical intrigue and aga~nst the ~nroads of conwrunism into the region·-
policies v7h::.ch vJill begin to bring to an end the largely indis-
criminate use of public funds for v1hat are often self-defeating 
purposes. 
Further to the East, Hr. President, moving tm-Jards the 
Pacific, there is little in the situation in which to find comfort. 
\Je go on, as He have been doing for years, spending, \-lith little 
question, vast sums of public funds, at best to hold a line against 
communism. Yet despite this outpouring, the line shm'ls signs of 
breaking down in a Laos just a fe,.·J months after 't·7e have been told 
that foreign aid had built the line solid in that country. And 
when a situation of that kind arises, lJhen it catches us unaware, 
what is the answer, Hr. President? Hore of the same; more aid in 
the same pattern as in the past. 
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As for stab:a:U:y and progress in ar..y of these nations, 
except in Japan and in India and one or two isolated spots, there 
is little evidence of tt. The lot of vast populations remains just 
about as miserable as ever; the enticements of authoritarianism 
are as intense as ever. I repeat, Hr. President, as far as United 
States policies in As·i a are concerned, they constitute, largel:L_ 
an enormously costly holding action from Korea to Pa!dstan and a 
holding action of very dub:i.ous reli~EJ-lity!.- Horeqver, Nr. Presi-
dent, they constitute a hold~ ng action which is developing disturb-
ing overtones. I refer to what is4 app~~ntly, a trend towards 
military or quasi-military authoritarian dictatorships in southern 
and southeast Asia. Those t·7ho administer our pol 1 cies seem in-
clined to look the other t~ay, to finL_the rationalizations wl~ 
put off the facing of the realities ·;nherent in th:i.s trend. To 
be sure, one can find good in the development. Hi l·i tary dictator-
ships produce more stability and order. at first. They are easier 
to deal with, at first. They even promise a measure of progress 
away from the corrupt-i on, the inertia, the inadequacy that char-
acterized many of the predecessor governments, at first. 
I3ut, Hr. President, no person bred :i_n this nation--alive 
to its premi se that man is f·~ t to govern himself--no person bred 
in that tradition can look with equanim·i ty, much less with eager-
ness, on the appearance of military or quasi-military regimes in 
so many lands with which we are intimately assoc·i ated. I must ask, 
Hr. President, is this the only answer which freedom can pose to 
communism? 
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I can only express the hope th~ those ~,Jho are r:esponsi-
ble for the adm-inistration of our policies and particularly our aid 
programs kno"J "td:lat they are doing. I can only eiq~ress~ hope_ that 
this military-at1.thoritarian trend :!.n non-Commun:::.st i\sia is a tem-
porary phenonemon, that ·: t is a step towards responsible and popu-
larly responsive government in these lands. 
There are things worse than instability in this 1;vorld 
and one of them is the ·lron hand of tyranny--communist or s.ny other. 
I cannot lool~ w·· th pr·l de on any action of th:!.s _g_ovet'Tlmer; advertent 
or inadvertent, that acts to close that hand on any people--no, not 
even in the mistaken zeal that this 'tvill somehO'i-·7 save them and us 
from communism. 
Administrat~on of Policy 
In my remarks so far, Nr . President, I have been dis-
cussi.ng matters over which, for the most part, 'tve do not--as a 
nation--exercise unilateral control. \-Jhat happens in the Far East, 
the Hiddle East, in Europe, the Americas or elsewhere is not "t-lithin 
our capacity alone to determine. Nor i s the responsibility for 
developments there uni.quely that of this Administration or any 
other. In most parts of the vlorld our inflnence ranges from im-
portant to peripheral but, in a practical sense, i t is not absolute 
anywhere and the sooner we disabuse ourselves of any idea that it 
is, the sooner we shall use with greater deftness, with less waste 
of public resources, such influence as we do possess. 
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There is an aspect of foreign relat:'..ons, ~1mqever, wh:'..ch 
·7 s wholly uith;n the province of the United States, 'Nherein respon-
sibility ~ests solely with this nation. I refer to the manner in 
~-1hich we ma~~e up our minds in foreign policy and, after we have 
made it up, what 'tve do and the way we do it. In short, I refer to 
the formulation and administration of polic~. 
Other nations do not tell this nation what to decide, as 
regards ~ts foreign relations. To be sure the attitudes of others, 
the circumstances abroad, our relationships with others influence 
our decisions. Indeed they should, for we are not a nation in a 
pressurized nose-cone some\vhere off in space. Dut awareness of 
the rest of the ~vorlcl, not·Nithstanding, in the last analysis, we 
decide for ourselves. He act for o•.2rselves. vJe make right de-
c isions or \·1rong ciecisi.ons. He act intelligently or foolishly as 
a result. And we bear the responsibility for these national de-
cisions and actions. In short, the buck-passing stops or should 
stop at the water's edge. He--not others--determ·1ne for what pur-
pose we have a State Department, an aid-administration, a Central 
Intelligence Agency, an Information Service anc a host of other 
_agencies vJhich carry on activities abroad on the basis of appro-
£riations from public funds and on behalf of the enti re nation. 
He alone d~£j._de hm-1 they shall funct i on. 
Uhen I use the term '1·Je, 11 Hr. Pres ident, I mean, of 
course, the people of the United States. In matters of foreign 
relations, however, the responsibility for interpreting what we 
want and how we are to pursue i t rests, in a theoretical sense, 
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vJith the elected President, acting in some ::nstances vlith the advice 
and consent of the elected Senate and in others with the concurrence 
of the elected Congress. 
That is the Constitutional theory, Hr. :?resident, but v1hat 
is the fact'? The fact is that the pov1er to interpret the will of 
the nation in respect to our vast and complicated relations with 
the rest of the world has been diffused through the eno~ 
labyrinth of the EJ~ecutive I3ranch of the government. The pov1er to 
decide, in short, has been scattered and diluted to the ,point v1here 
it has become virtually impossib~e to fix responsibility. It has 
been scattered and diluted to the point where it has become vir-
tually impossible to use the public pov1er effectively to bring 
about adjustments in policy and ·' ts adm~nistration at somewhere near 
the time that these ad·justments are needed. 
In these c~rcumstance3, national interests freguently be-
come so ~ntenmven "tJitL bureaucrati c interests and conflicts that 
'1;-Je are less and less able to adjust the total needs of the nation 
to the changing circumstances o::= the Horld. Hore and more we have 
a policy determined by Ejcecut~ve agency accommodation ancl less and 
less by the leadership and decision of the respons·:ble political 
officials of the Adrninistrat:on and the Congress. I believe the 
able Senator from Hinnesota (Nr. aumphrey) illustrated this point 
most forcibly a short time ago on the floor vJith regard to policy 
formulation on the testing of nuclear v1eapons. He shm'led how 
agency confl~cts were producing a situation that undercut our 
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negotiators i.n Geneva. His statement apparently \Jas heard at the 
Hhite House for the President made a decision on this question 
shortly thereafter. Bt'.t, l1r. President, thi.s is the kind of de-
cision \<1hich should be forthcoming promptly with:i.n the Administra-
tion on the basis of need. It ou2ht not to requ~re prodding from 
the Senate. 
I realize that th~s problem has been with the nation for 
a long time. It is not amenable to easy solution. Nevertheless, 
Hr. President, 'li1e must deal ~1ith it, if responsible government in 
the field of foreign policy is not to degenerate into a catch-
phrase. ~.Ye mu.st stay with this problem--the President and the 
Congress--until it yields to rational solution. 
The able Senator from nashington (Hr. Jackson) has rec-
ognized the deplorable creaki.ness of the decision-making machinery 
of the nation in critical matters of foreign relations and defense. 
He has supplied the initiative and set in motion a special Senate 
:lnvestj_gation of the problem which has been promised the cooperation 
of the Administration. That coo~eration is essential because re-
sponsibility for this problem rests primarily and preponderantly 
with the Administration. 
I should like to suggest, Nr. Presi dent, that we may 
find the way to a reasonable solut~on to this problem in a diligent 
assertion of the primary authority of the Presidency in matters 
directly or ~ndirectly relatecl to foreign policy and a reassertionz 
under the President, of the respons i bi lity of the Secretary and 
the Department of State for the conduct of foreign relations. 
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If the Department of S·t:ate :_s not organi zed to handle 
these matters in thei r totality, then let us reorganize it. If it 
is not egu~pped, then let ~s equi p it. !f its nersonnel is not 
( -
properly trained, then let us seek to provide the training. If 
it has not seff~cient resources, f~nancial or othe~qise, then let 
us mal:e these resources available to it. 
Dut let us not, i n an effort to compensate for the real 
or imagined shortcomings of the Department of State so scatter 
responsibili ties in forei gn relati ons through the ~ilitary depart-
ments, the agr~cultural department, the I.C.A., the C.I.A., the 
Commerce Department or whatever 7 that the costs of administeri ng 
forei gn pol-l cy r ·i se enormously and, i n rat i o, the constructi ve 
results decli ne drast:~cal1y. He have already carri ed this process 
so far that i n our offi cial representati on abroad, the employees 
of the Department of State, numerous as they may be, are i n many 
instances far outnumoered by the representat1ves of other United 
States agencies. And although the Department of State bears ulti-
mate responsi bi l i ty for rel at; ons abroad, i t e:~erc ises only the 
most nomi nal i nfluence over the use of the resources and the act i ons 
oj:_ t_h_e _ _persopnel of these other agenci es. 
I beli eve thi s sessi on of the 06th Congress has made a 
highly s i gn:i.f:': .. cant advance vJhi ch can act to bri ng about a major 
improvement i n the administrati on of fore i gn relati ons. I refer 
to the authori zing legislati on whi ch the Congress has passed in 
the field of foreign-ai d. If i t i s reasonabl y i nterpreted by the 
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Administration, this legislation, as extensively amended by Con-
gress, can act to fix authority and responsibility for this signi-
ficant undertaking much more ·decisively, than is now the case. 
Cne amendment provides for an inspector-general in the Department 
of State to probe the weaknesses in every aspect of the aid-
program. A second provides for the ending of the non-security re-
lated secrecy which has surrounded this program. Still another 
separates military aid from other forms of aid but provides for 
close control over the entire program by the Secretary of State. 
Finally, Mr. President, a fourth amendment requires the ~cecutive 
Branch to submit plans for the gradual termination of massive 
grants, as the program moves more and more to a loan basis. These 
amendments, ~~. President, can do much to end aid by force of habit 
and to give to the program more purpose and direction within the 
context of our total policy. They can reduce the waste and any 
tendencies towards corrupt practices. 
The Congressional action on foreign aid, Mr. President, 
is only a first step in bringing about a more integrated, stream-
lined and responsible administration of the nation's international 
affairs. Much remains to be done in regard to other agencies which 
have injected themselves or have been inje.cted into these matters 
without adequate coordination under the Secretary of State and 
without adequate control by the elected officials of this govern-
ment. 
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Concluding Comments 
t1r. President, I have talked at great length today. But 
there is much that needs saying on this subject of the nation's 
foreign relations and their administration, much more than I have 
said. I wanted these thoughts, hm-1ever, to be on the Record at 
this time. For, in the near future, discussions will be raking 
place between the President and Mr. l<hrushchev and others of the 
highest importance to the nation. It is possible to question the 
wisdom of these meetings at this point in time and circumstance, 
as has been done. But the decision to hold them has been made by 
the President and, at a recent press conference, he put the signi-
ficance of these meetings in proper perspective when in response 
to questions as to their propriety he stated: i•vJe are talking 
about the human race and what's going to happen to it:1 and 11any 
President that refused finally to use the last atom of prestige 
or the last atom of his energy /In this quest for peac~7 ••• 
ought to be condemned by the American people • . : 
Yet these impending discussions--however sell-intentioned 
--are but a part of the search for a better road for this nat!on 
and mankind. The work of securing the t'lell-being and the peace of 
the people of the United States will not end wi th the impending 
exchanges. He shall be better prepared to do what still needs to 
be done if \ole understand more clearly the ~.;orld~·;ide dimensions of 
the undertaking which confronts us, if we ready our spirits and 
determination for the tasl~s which the impending conferences may 
make possible. 
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